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How	the	Middle	East	oil	pricing	system	emerged	in	the
1940s
How	did	the	Middle	East	become	both	a	new	geographical	base-point	for	petroleum	transactions	and	the	hub	of	the
global	pricing	system?
Several	giant	Middle	East	oilfields	were	discovered	between	1943	and	1947.	Before	that,	the	United	States	and	the
Gulf	of	Mexico	region	produced	the	bulk	of	the	oil	consumed	in	the	world.	Maintaining	a	global	price	equilibrium	was
essential	for	the	US’	economy,	international	power	and	engagement	in	war	efforts.	The	disclosure	of	the	region’s
potentially	large	reserves	–	and	low	production	costs	–	rendered	the	global	pricing	equilibrium	more	difficult	to
sustain.
To	deal	with	the	price	dilemmas	they	were	facing,	corporations	and	governments	came	up	with	a	pricing	method
called	netback.	The	idea	was	to	make	Middle	East	oil	reach	Western	markets	at	the	same	price	as	oil	produced	in
the	Americas.	Our	research	shows	that	the	netback	pricing	method	provided	the	solution	for	many	of	these
dilemmas.	In	effect,	this	estimation	method	was	flexible	enough	not	only	to	serve	as	a	reference	for	normative
regulatory	policies	but	also	as	an	instrument	for	different	business	strategies.	Below	we	try	to	convey	how	two
interpretations	of	the	netback	pricing	formula	emerged	in	the	Middle	East,	endorsed	respectively	by	the	Exxon	and
Gulf	Oil	companies.
In	June	1948,	Eugene	Holman,	then	president	of	the	giant	New	Jersey-based	Exxon	oil	corporation,	announced	to
the	press	his	commitment	towards	netback	prices	for	Saudi	Arabian	Light	crude,	with	Caribbean	oil	as	the	key
reference	point	(basing	point).	To	arrive	at	the	netback	price,	they	summed	up	the	price	of	an	equivalent	Venezuelan
oil	(Jusepin	crude)	with	the	travel	costs	to	the	final	destination	(in	this	case	from	Maracaibo	to	Southampton),	and
then	subtracted	the	transport	costs	from	Saudi	Arabia	to	Southampton.	The	resulting	number	was	what	crude	oil
should	be	priced	free	on	board	(FOB)	at	the	Saudi	Arabian	port	of	Ras	Tanura.	When	it	arrived	in	Southampton	it
would	have	the	same	customs,	insurance	and	freight	(CIF)	price	of	Venezuelan	crude.	That	was	the	Arabian
crude	netback	price	prevailing	in	the	British	Isles.
With	this	system,	British	consumers	paid	the	same	price	for	oil	from	different	geographical	sources.	Some	weeks
earlier,	the	netback	pricing	methodology	had	also	been	suggested	by	the	Marshal	Plan’s	agency	to	streamline	Middle
East	oil	procurement	and	supply	this	essential	commodity	for	the	reconstruction	of	Europe.
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Incumbent	market	leaders,	such	as	Exxon	(or	Royal	Dutch	Shell),	which	had	a	strong	presence	not	only	in	the	US
but	also	in	other	producing	regions,	including	Indonesia,	Romania,	Austria,	Venezuela,	Peru,	Colombia,	Canada	and
the	Middle	East	(not	to	mention	their	former	stakes	in	the	Soviet	Union	and	Mexico	wiped	out	by	nationalisations),
stood	to	gain	considerably	from	this	international	pricing	system.	Such	prices	would	return	extra	profits	for	their	low-
cost	Middle	East	oil	production	fields,	while	defending	investments	already	made	in	exporting	countries	with	mature
oilfields.
If	they	had	used	competitive	cost-plus	prices,	they	would	have	pushed	Arabian	oil	into	competing	with	their
Venezuelan	and	Texan	subsidiaries	in	Western	hemisphere	markets,	hurting	the	businesses	of	core	companies	while
enabling	fast	growth	in	the	Middle	East’s	market	share.
Holman’s	commitment	to	netback	pricing	underpinned	Exxon’s	engagement	with	global	prices.	He	wanted	to	escape
the	crossfire	unleashed	in	the	Senate	and	in	Congress	against	the	practices	of	big	oil	corporations.	The	time	was	ripe
for	a	public	rejoinder.	In	the	ensuing	months,	the	Marshal	Plan’s	authorities	concurred	with	the	position	that
Exxon’s	netback	pricing	formula	“qualified	as	a	competitive	price”	for	allocation	purposes.	The	pricing	dilemma	had
therefore	been	satisfactorily	solved.
However,	the	entire	architecture	would	soon	be	shattered	through	its	own	backdoor,	due	to	the	onset	of	US
petroleum	imports.	When	the	Persian	Gulf	surplus	became	large	enough	to	flow	into	North	America,	a	second
equalisation	point	surfaced.
As	of	1949,	all	companies	stuck	to	the	official	Marshall	Plan-financed	prices	of	$2.03,	$1.97	and	$2.76	per	barrel	for
Arabian,	Kuwait	and	Iraq	crudes,	respectively,	then	getting	exported	to	Europe.	However,	they	used	a	different	price
list	for	oil	heading	to	the	US	East	Coast,	charging	$1.43,	$1.30	and	$1.75	per	barrel,	respectively,	for	similar
shipments,	accounted	for	as	intra-company	transactions.	As	long	as	these	transactions	were	not	subject	to	arm’s
length	bargaining,	they	could	remain	undisclosed	and	under	the	seal	of	commercial	secrecy.	However,	keeping	such
a	conspicuous	trade	flow	concealed	for	a	long	time	proved	difficult.
The	discovery	of	shadow	prices	in	crude	transactions	sent	shock	waves	throughout	America.	Netback	prices	now
appeared	merely	as	a	cover	for	overcharging	the	European	aid	program	while	the	companies	pursued	a	policy	of
competitive	transfer	pricing	in	corporate	business	dealings	with	the	United	States.	Homeland	discontent	mounted	in
many	quarters,	spearheaded	by	organisations	representing	the	independent	oil	companies	that	accused	the
assistance	program	of	using	American	taxpayer	money	to	subsidise	a	few	private	concerns	in	permitting	them	to
dump	surplus	oil	in	American	markets.
All	such	endeavours	resulted	in	greater	pressure	upon	the	oil	majors	to	close	the	gap	between	the	intra-company
transfer	prices	and	the	official	financed	prices.	In	February	1949,	Paul	Hoffman,	the	Marshal	Plan	Director,	informed
the	companies	that	the	price	charged	for	Middle	East	crude	oil	sales	to	the	United	Sates	had	an	important	bearing	on
determining	the	competitive	market	price,	and	furthermore	requested	a	global	re-examination	of	this	issue.
The	reactions	were	contradictory,	with	New	Jersey	Standard-Exxon,	Standard	of	California-Chevron	and	Texaco
blatantly	refusing	any	reduction	in	the	netback	price	of	$2.03	per	barrel,	while	Socony-Mobil	agreed	to	think	the	issue
over.	Retreating	from	parallel	pricing,	Gulf	Oil	then	broke	with	the	oligopolistic	consent	and	yielded	up	two	price
reductions:	the	first	was	15	cents	in	April	1949;	the	second	was	13	cents	in	July	1949.	With	the	downward
adjustment	in	official	Kuwait	crude	31º	API	oil	prices	to	$1.75	per	barrel,	all	the	majors	were	compelled	to	follow	suit,
pushing	the	marker	for	Saudi	light	crude	to	$1.71	per	barrel.
Gulf	Oil’s	historical	deviation	in	pricing	best	illustrates	the	prevalence	of	corporate	self-interests	over	collusive
practices.	It	stood	out	as	the	most	deviant	firm,	at	least	in	potential	terms.	In	contrast	with	the	other	oil	multinationals,
the	company	explored	the	fastest	growing	oilfields	in	the	Middle	East,	supplied	residual	demand	for	crude	and
petroleum	products	in	Europe	(i.e.	the	available	portion	of	market	demand	not	supplied	by	other	firms	already	in	the
market),	and	met	core	demand	for	crude	in	the	United	States	where	it	operated	a	highly	integrated	business	based
on	its	East	Texas	oilfields.	For	these	reasons,	Gulf	Oil	would	only	ever	be	marginally	affected	by	any	possible
change	in	the	Marshall	Plan	pricing	policy	while	still	enjoying	the	freedom	to	replace	European	sales	with	American
ones.
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Ironically,	all	the	efforts	to	objectify	the	pricing	policy	by	grounding	decisions	on	formulas	ended	up	in	prices	being
set	by	successive	calibrations	and	negotiations.	From	the	viewpoint	of	the	authorities,	while	the	$2.03/barrel	ceiling
rested	upon	a	system	of	logic	(the	main	trade	flows	to	Europe)	and	a	principle	of	equity	(netback	equalisation),	the
$1.75/barrel	Gulf	Oil	price	was	simply	a	‘token	reduction’	imposed	by	the	circumstances.
To	ascertain	whether	this	new	Middle	East	oil	price	was	a	just	and	arbitrary	calibration,	we	have	reconstructed	the
time	series	for	official	Saudi	Arabian	crude	prices	and	the	corresponding	netback	price	with	Southampton-England
and	New	York-USA	as	equalisation	points.	The	result	shows	that	the	Gulf	Oil	“token	reductions”	in	fact	almost
perfectly	matched	North	America	netbacks	throughout	1950	(figure	1).
Figure	1.	Time	series	for	official	Saudi	Arabian	crude	prices	and	the	corresponding	netback	price	with	Southhampton	and	New
York	as	equalisation	points
Sources	and	methods:	Madureira,	2017
The	critical	juncture	of	1949-1950	became	a	turning	point	in	the	history	of	global	oil	prices	because	it	shifted	the	point
of	equalisation	from	North	Europe	to	the	East	Coast	of	the	United	States.	Indeed,	given	the	potential	oil	reserves	in
the	Persian	Gulf,	1950	constituted	the	breakthrough	moment	when	the	Middle	East	became	the	central	axis	of	the
world	petroleum	economy.	With	the	official	price	at	$1.75	per	barrel,	Middle	East	producers	could	beat—or	at	least
equal—the	competition	everywhere.	When	prices	were	aligned	by	the	US	netback,	a	new	yardstick	ultimately
emerged.	Moreover,	with	exports	to	the	US,	the	tendency	for	only	one	FOB	price	level	to	be	effective	for	all
destinations	inevitably	followed	suit.
A	global	oil	pricing	system	briefly	emerged	out	of	this	chain	of	events,	interlinking	Middle	East	production	centres	in
the	Eastern	hemisphere	with	the	American	and	Caribbean	oilfields	in	the	Western	hemisphere.	Under	stable	freight
tanker	rates,	this	system	ensured	the	global	competitiveness	of	the	Persian	Gulf	petroleum	region.
♣♣♣
Notes:
This	blog	post	is	based	on	the	author’s	paper	Squabbling	Sisters:	Multinational	Companies	and	Middle	East	Oil
Prices,	Business	History	Review,	2017	(91)	4,	681-706.	
The	post	gives	the	views	of	its	authors,	not	the	position	of	LSE	Business	Review	or	the	London	School	of
Economics.
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